Yet, as this paper will demonstrate, China has not been entirely immune from the legislative wildfire generated by 9/11 nor from the core tension between national security and human rights protection that has been evident across the world. Indeed, the key criticism levelled at governments in the West post-9/11, particularly in the US and UK, has been that national security or anti-terror laws have tended to erode standards of human rights protection. This concern has been even greater in relation to non-democratic states such as China, with various Western governments and nongovernmental organisations such as Amnesty International accusing Beijing of utilising post-9/11 international concern with terrorism as an excuse to tighten controls on society and clamp down on dissent.
2 I argue that while this dynamic of privileging security concerns over protecting human rights is prevalent in China, it is one that is acutely felt in a specific regional context that has broad implications for China's domestic politics and international relations. As will be noted below, China's terrorist problem is largely isolated to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the far north-west of the country. Moreover, the central charge levelled against prominent Western governments -i.e. that national security/anti-terror laws have eroded the protection of individual human rights -is one that needs to be tempered in the context of Xinjiang by noting that the impact of anti-terror laws/national security laws has simply been to widen the scope for the state's suppression of real and imagined threats to national security. This ultimately has resulted in further violations of individual human rights not only within Xinjiang but in the neighbouring Central Asian states in which significant numbers of Uyghurs reside.
China's response to the issue of terrorism post-9/11 has operated at two levels.
Internationally, Beijing has reconfigured its discourse regarding Xinjiang and the Uyghurs to reflect the contemporary international focus on Islamist-inspired terrorism and extremism in order to gain international recognition of its 'legitimate' struggle against Uyghur terrorism. China's efforts in this regard should be seen as a continuation of a long-term struggle to integrate this ethnically diverse region. Domestically, the 'war on terror' has permitted China to not only deploy significant repressive force, in political, legal and police/military terms, to confront the perceived threat to Xinjiang's security posed by Uyghur terrorism but also to establish the political and legal framework through which to confront any future challenges to state power. This latter aspect can be seen in Beijing's increasing tendency to label not only dissenting Uyghurs but also Tibetans, Falun Gong members, and even protesting workers/peasants as 'terrorists'. China has moved toward the achievement of these goals through three main avenues: amendments to China's criminal law; the deployment of an expansive definition of 'terrorism'; and security and counter-terror cooperation with the states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and rhetorical support for the US 'War on Terror'.
Chinese Policy and 'Terrorism' in Xinjiang
Over a long period of time -especially since the 1990s -the "East Turkistan" forces inside and outside Chinese territory have planned and organized a series of violent incidents in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China and some other countries, including explosions, assassinations, arsons, poisonings, and assaults, with the objective of founding a so-called state of "East Turkistan". These terrorist incidents have seriously jeopardized the lives and property of the people of all ethnic groups as well as social stability in China, and even threatened the security and stability of related countries and regions. However, it needs to be recognized that China's efforts to prevent the separation of confronted the 'three evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism' in Xinjiang. 22 Accompanying this turn of events was a change in rhetoric of the Chinese government whereby Beijing did not fail to discuss events in Xinjiang without reference to the 'war on terror', 'terrorism' or 'extremism'. Although this tendency had been present prior to 9/11, particularly within the context of China's diplomacy toward the Central Asian states and the multilateral SCO, it was now a central element of its public international diplomacy. 23 China was also quick to support the US-led 'war on terror'
through voting for a anti-terrorism resolution in the United Nations Security Council, supporting Pakistan in its pro-United States efforts against Osama bin-Laden, providing intelligence information on terrorist networks and activities in the region and freezing the accounts of terrorist suspects in Chinese banks. 24 These efforts bore significant fruit for Beijing with the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage announcing in August 2002 that the US would officially list the 'East Turkestan Islamic Movement' as an international terrorist organisation, a lead which the UN subsequently followed. 25 For many critical observers, however, these developments suggested that as in numerous other cases throughout the world, national and international security -narrowly defined as ensuring the security of sovereign states -had taken precedence over the promotion and protection of universal human rights standards. 26 It is to this international dynamic and its implications for human rights in China, and Xinjiang in particular, that we now turn. Other states, particularly those in the developing world, have in contrast rejected this position arguing that it fails to take into consideration terrorism as a legitimate political tactic in movements for self-determination. 31 This fundamental disagreement has in the past resulted in previous international agreements relating to acts of terrorism affirming the right of self-determination. The 1979 UN Convention against the Taking of Hostages, for example, states in its preamble that the states party to the convention reaffirm, 'the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations'. 32 Reiterates that the criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons for political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a develop an expansive definition of terrorism that includes many actions that elsewhere would not fall under the label. This is not to imply too sanguine a view of the likely impact of such a development within the UN but rather to note that Beijing, as a self-consciously 'rising' power in the international system has become increasingly concerned with ensuring that it is seen to uphold the existing international order. 36 Thus, as a number of observers have noted, much of China's diplomacy is focused on portraying contemporary China as a 'normal' state in contrast to the radical, outlier state, that it was during the Maoist era and an important element of this concerns China's commitment to prevailing international norms and regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or UN human rights standards. 37 Nonetheless the overall impact of these two developments in the context of Xinjiang has been for the Chinese authorities to effectively 'widen the net' to ensnare many Uyghurs on the basis of 'terrorism' charges. • The first amendment to Article 120 states that a person who, 'forms or leads a terrorist organization shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment'. Those persons who, 'actively participate in a terrorist organization' are to be imprisoned to fixed-term of 'not less than 3 years'.
Widening the
• The second amendment of Article 120 states that, 'Whoever provides funds to any terrorist organization or individual who engages in terrorism' is to be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 'not more than 5 years'.
• Article 125 revised to stipulate fixed-term imprisonment of 'not less than 5
years' for persons who, 'illegally manufactures, trades in, transports or stores poisonous or radioactive substances…thereby endangering public security'
• Article 127 revised to stipulate fixed term imprisonment of 'not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death' for persons who steal 'ammunition, explosives' or other dangerous substances from 'State organs'
• Article 191 revised to stipulate fixed term imprisonment of 'not more than 5
years' or 'criminal detention' for illegal financial operations or gains connected to 'drug related crimes or from crimes committed by organizations in the nature of criminal syndicates, crimes of terrorism or crimes of smuggling'.
• New clause added to Article 291 that stipulates fixed-term imprisonment of 'not more than 5 years' for persons who 'disturb social order' by gathering in public places, block traffic or obstruct agents of the State. This clause also stipulates the same punishment for persons who spread 'hoaxes of explosive, poisonous or radioactive substances' or fabricate 'terrorist information'.
However, if 'the consequences are serious' the sentence will be a fixed-term of 'not less than 5 years'.
What are the implications for human rights in China of these amendments to the Criminal Law? Perhaps most troubling for human rights advocates such as Amnesty
International is that these amendments increase the scope for the use of the death penalty in China. 40 For example, as noted above Articles 115, 125 and 127 carry punishments that range from terms of imprisonment to the death penalty for crimes ranging from 'arson' to illegally manufacturing or transporting 'poisonous or radioactive substances'. The amendments to Article 120 meanwhile suggest a turn not only towards the criminalisation of 'terrorism' but also of political dissent in general.
First, the amendments make it a criminal offence to be a member of a 'terrorist organization' whether or not any other illegal act is committed. The failure to define what constitutes a 'terrorist organization' leaves the door open for this law to be deployed against any groupings, organizations or religious associations that the state deems to be a threat whether they be political or non-political or non-violent.
Moreover, the second amendment of Article 120 also fails to specify a maximum sentence thus potentially making it a capital offence to be charged with 'funding of a terrorist organization'. Ultimately, the amendments to Article 120 provide an expansive list of potential 'terrorist' crimes without providing a concrete definition of terrorism with which to judge potential acts of the 'terrorists'.
Article 191 and the new clause to Article 291 also reflect this trajectory towards the criminalisation of dissent. Article 191 for instance makes it a criminal offence to be connected financially to acts the state deems to amount to 'terrorist crimes'.
Moreover, the new clause to Article 291 also holds the potential to criminalise the dissemination of information and public meetings or associations. Indeed, Amnesty
International reports that Article 291 has in the past been used to punish people peacefully exercising the right to free expression through peaceful public gatherings or demonstrations. 41 As with a number of the previous articles, the new clause to
Article 291 also fails to specify a maximum sentence or to clearly define 'serious consequences'. Thus, this new clause raises the possibility that those persons convicted of the offences specified may face the death penalty if the acts are deemed to have caused 'serious consequences'. …have their headquarters either inside or outside Chinese territory, would be engaged in terrorist activities involving violence and terror and causing harm to state security, social stability, lives and property. Secondly, they would have established leadership and organizational structures with specialized roles within the structures. 42 Beyond this the organization must satisfy one of the following criteria in addition to the first two:
1) Currently or previously involved in the organization, planning, instigation, conduct or implementation of terrorist activities; 2) Financing and supporting terrorist activities; 3) Building bases used for terrorist activities or organizing, recruiting and training terrorists; and 4) Collaborating with international terrorist organizations by receiving finance or training from these organizations or engaging in terrorist activities with them.
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Meanwhile 'terrorists' according to Zhao are defined as:
…people who have significant relationships with terrorist organizations engaged in terrorist activities harmful to state security or the lives and property of people inside or outside Chinese territory. This would apply irrespective of whether or not they have become naturalized citizens of foreign countries.
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In addition to this, one must meet one of the following criteria to be deemed a 'terrorist': 1) Organizing, commanding or engaged in terrorist activities; 2) Organizing, planning, propagating, or instigating the implementation of terrorist activities; 3) Financing and supporting terrorist organizations or terrorists to assist them in the conduct of terrorist activities; and 4) Funded or trained by a terrorist organization or other international organization to engage in terrorist activities. 45 Thus, China's response to terrorism post-9/11 is characterised by three major issues that raise concern regarding their impact on human rights:
• A lack of precision regarding what constitutes 'terrorism'
• The provisions under these articles hold the potential to criminalize a wide range of activities, including peaceful expressions of dissent or opposition to the state
• The death penalty may be applied under the majority of the amendments
Implications for Human Rights in Post-9/11 Xinjiang
Although, as I have noted above, China's struggle against 'splittists' and 'separatists'
in Xinjiang pre-dates the events of 9/11, Beijing nonetheless promptly adopted the rhetoric of the 'war on terror' to justify its ongoing repression of Uyghur opposition.
This can be seen in China's diplomatic offensive since 9/11 within the context of its relations with the members of the SCO and with the US and in government statements regrading either the 'war on terrorism' or the situation in Xinjiang. 13. Engaging in religious infiltration, setting up religious organizations, conducting proselytism and so on, by hostile enemy forces 14. Advocating "holy war," inciting religious fanaticism, developing religious extremist forces, spreading rumors, distorting history, advocating separatism, opposing the Party and the socialist system, sabotaging social stability or the unity of nationalities, inciting the masses to illegally rally and demonstrate, attacking the organs of the Party, government, army or public security 15. Using religion to breed separatist elements and reactionary backbone elements or to establish reactionary organizations; to carry out other activities that are harmful to the good order of society, production and life, and to criminal activities 16. Spreading evil cults. 53 Beyond detailing a comprehensive will to control religious observance in Xinjiang, these proscriptions demonstrate not only a curtailment of the right to freedom of religious expression but also other basic civil and political rights. For instance, 'inciting the masses to illegally rally and demonstrate' is arguably aimed at controlling the freedom of assembly, 'distorting history' and 'using religion to meddle in administration, justice and education, weddings, family planning or cultural activities' compromises freedom of expression while the proscription against 'going abroad to study religion' tramples on freedom of movement. On this latter point, it has been widely reported that the authorities have recently placed severe restrictions on international travel for Uyghurs by confiscating passports. This has been done in order to prevent many Uyghurs from undertaking the annual pilgrimage to Mecca through other than state-sanctioned and supervised Hajj tours. Indeed, Wang Lequan in June 2007 specifically called on local authorities to harshly punish 'illegal pilgrimage organizers'. 54 According to one anecdotal report, to qualify for official approval to undertake the Hajj one must meet a number of criteria including providing proof of no previous links to 'independence groups' or 'anti-Chinese activities' or, failing that, provide the relevant authorities with a 'fee' of up to 20, 000 yuan. 55 These measures are symptomatic of a stepped up campaign against religious observance in Xinjiang. While this was evident in the past, particularly during the 'Strike Hard' campaigns of the 1990s as noted previously, 9/11 has evidently prompted the authorities to renew and intensify the measures through which it attempts to control religion in Xinjiang. As in the past, these measures not only targeted those deemed to be actively opposing the state but were also applied to religious and cultural practices that, in the state's perception, reinforced ethnic minority separateness from the Chinese state. Thus, Muslim clerics and students were arrested or detained for participation in "illegal religious activities," "illegal religious centers" closed, and imams compelled to attend "political education" sessions.
Religious worship, education, or instruction has also been restricted to those 18 years of age and above, and a general discrimination against religious observance implemented.
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Official statements on the scale of arrests since 9/11 in the region have been rare.
However a number have claimed that:
• 166 'terrorists and other violent criminals' were arrested by security forces • Using news media to propagate separatist thought
• Using periodicals, works of literature and art performances; presenting the subject in satires or allegories that give free reign to and disseminate dissatisfaction and propagate separatist thought
• Illegally printing reactionary books and periodicals; distributing or posting reactionary leaflets, letters and posters; spreading rumors to confuse the people; instilling the public with separatist sentiment
• Using audio and video recordings, such as audio tapes, CDs or VCDs, to incite religious fanaticism and promote "holy war"
• Forging alliances with outside separatist and enemy forces, making use of broadcasts, the Internet, and other means to intensify campaigns of reactionary propaganda and infiltration of ideas into public opinion
• Using popular cultural activities to make the masses receptive to reactionary propaganda encouraging opposition. 
Conclusion
In conclusion this paper has demonstrated that China has utilised international concern with terrorism to further its campaign against Uyghur separatism and dissent in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has also detailed that China has followed an international trend in relying upon domestic law and policing to combat terrorism with an emphasis on criminalising 'terrorism' without reference to motives that may underpin such acts. The net result in the Xinjiang context has been the further erosion of individual human rights of the region's ethnic minorities but particularly the Uyghur. In the wider national context of the People's Republic, the changes to the criminal law hold the potential to criminalize dissent through the application of an ambiguous and expansive definition of terrorism. Meanwhile, China has arguably been successful in portraying its approach in Xinjiang as a response to 'international terrorism', particularly in its relations with the states of the SCO and to a lesser degree the US under the Bush Administration. In effect, the Chinese government has utilised the prevailing post-9/11 trend for privileging state security over individual human rights to augment its existing methods of political and social control in Xinjiang.
However, the impact of China's response to the events of 9/11 and the situation in Xinjiang on Beijing's international standing or reputation has been contradictory. On the one hand Beijing has followed an international trend toward the criminalisation of terrorism regardless of the motive, while on the other it has been perceived to have opportunistically used post-9/11 concern with terrorism to bolster the control of the party-state. The historical irony here, of course, is that Beijing no longer positions itself as the champion of 'national liberation' or 'self-determination' movements as it did during the 1960s and 1970s. Now China portrays itself as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system, a position that compels it to pursue policies of a conservative, status quo nature, such as privileging the security of the state. 76 Yet, as the case of Xinjiang demonstrates, this heavy emphasis on an inherently conservative and Westphalian principles such as 'non-interference' in internal affairs and respect for state sovereignty is increasingly at odds with prevailing Western notions of the proper relationship between the state, society and security. Not coincidently these are principles which China has embedded in the pre-eminent multilateral organization in Central Asia, the SCO, which assists in Beijing's imperative to secure Xinjiang. 77 The irony, however, is that what China intends to maintain intact, such as a strict interpretation of state sovereignty in classical terms, is what the West wants to play down. The conflict lies in the fact that China is at pains to keep the traditional system of interstate relations in order to protect its sovereign interests, while the US acts like a 'revisionist power, working to change the existing world order to make allowance for humanitarian intervention, contrary to the classical understanding of sovereign rights and non-intervention in domestic affairs of another country. 
